Alief in Action (and Reaction)

Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585 (2008)
Abstract
I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by nonconscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate control.
Keywords Belief   Imagination
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Eric Mandelbaum (2013). Against Alief. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):197-211.
Shen-yi Liao (2013). Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):269-289.
Tyler Doggett & Andy Egan (2012). How We Feel About Terrible, Non-Existent Mafiosi. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):277-306.

View all 18 citations

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