Online research in philosophy

This book provides an overview of the entire discipline of world affairs in a way that makes immediate sense. It is also a critique of the limits that rationalism sets on how we know world affairs, showing how we might transcend these limits by augmenting rationalist research with non-rationalist techniques. It should appeal to anyone interested in why analysts so often seem to explain world affairs inaccurately and misunderstand what these affairs mean.

The causal theory, by J. Locke.--Phenomenalism, by G. Berkeley.--Skepticism, by D. Hume.--Traditional rationalism, by G. W. Leibniz.--Critical rationalism, by I. Kant.--Empiricism, by C. I. Lewis.--The quest for certainty, by R. Descartes.--Knowing and believing, by H. A. Prichard.--The right to be sure, by A. J. Ayer.

I argue that contemporary philosophy of language in the analytic tradition rests on two fundamentally wrong assumptions: empiricism and externalism. After I show why these two assumptions are incorrect, I turn my attention to biological rationalism. Biological rationalism—a research program inspired by the work of Noam Chomsky—is committed to nativism and internalism. I believe biological rationalism provides the best framework to achieve a genuine understanding of language. I try to show this by considering the biological rationalist answers to major problems in philosophy of language.

This paper provides a rationale for advocating pancritical rationalism. First, it argues that the advocate of critical rationalism may accept (but not be internally justified in accepting) that there is ‘justification’ in an externalist sense, specifically that certain procedures can track truth, and suggest that this recognition should inform practice; that one should try to determine which sources and methods are appropriate for various aspects of inquiry, and to what extent they are. Second, it argues that if there is external justification, then a critical rationalist is better off than a dogmatist from an evolutionary perspective.

Certainty and doubt -- Sources of conviction -- Rationalism -- Rationalism versus relativism in morals -- Induction and deduction -- The retreat from certainty -- Utilitarianism -- Kantian ethics -- Empiricism -- Beyond empiricism -- Objectivity -- Materialism and dualism -- Morality for naturalists -- Deep illusions -- Realism.