David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In John Hawthorne & Tamar Szabó Gendler (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 1--30 (2006)
Much contemporary discussion of perceptual experience can be traced to two observations. The first is that perception seems to put us in direct contact with the world around us: when perception is successful, we come to recognize— immediately—that certain objects have certain properties. The second is that perceptual experience may fail to provide such knowledge: when we fall prey to illusion or hallucination, the way things appear may differ radically from the way things actually are. For much of the twentieth century, many of the most important discussions of perceptual experience could be fruitfully understood as responses to this pair of observations.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Johannes Roessler (2009). Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Knowledge. Mind 118 (472):1013-1041.
Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19 - 48.
Bill Brewer (2008). How to Account for Illusion. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 168-180.
Ram Neta (2008). In Defense of Disjunctivism. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 311--29.
Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) (2006). Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
Casey O'Callaghan (2008). Seeing What You Hear: Cross-Modal Illusions and Perception. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):316-338.
David Hilbert (1994). Is Seeing Believing? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:446 - 453.
Charles S. Travis (2004). The Silence of the Senses. Mind 113 (449):57-94.
Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Perception, Generality, and Reasons. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. 131--57.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads76 ( #18,344 of 1,102,781 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #84,523 of 1,102,781 )
How can I increase my downloads?