David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):34-54 (2002)
Through careful analysis of a speciﬁc example, Parﬁt’s ‘ﬁssion argument’ for the unimportance of personal identity, I argue that our judgements concerning imaginary scenarios are likely to be unreliable when the scenarios involve disruptions of certain contingent correlations. Parﬁt’s argument depends on our hypothesizing away a number of facts which play a central role in our understanding and employment of the very concept under investigation; as a result, it fails to establish what Parﬁt claims, namely, that identity is not what matters. I argue that Parﬁt’s conclusion can be blocked without denying that he has presented an imaginary case where prudential concern would be rational in the absence of identity. My analysis depends on the recognition that the features that explain or justify a relation may be distinct from the features that underpin it as necessary conditions.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
David K. Lewis (1983). Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press.
Eric T. Olson (1997). The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford University Press.
J. David Velleman (1999). Love as a Moral Emotion. Ethics 109 (2):338-374.
Mark Johnston (1987). Human Beings. Journal of Philosophy 84 (February):59-83.
J. David Velleman (1996). Self to Self. Philosophical Review 105 (1):39 - 76.
Citations of this work BETA
Andrew M. Bailey (2015). Animalism. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Jonathan Ichikawa & Benjamin Jarvis (2009). Thought-Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):221 - 246.
Alex Worsnip (2016). Moral Reasons, Epistemic Reasons, and Rationality. Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):341-361.
Brian J. Scholl (2007). Object Persistence in Philosophy and Psychology. Mind and Language 22 (5):563–591.
Jacob Ross (2014). Divided We Fall. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):222-262.
Similar books and articles
David W. Shoemaker (1999). Selves and Moral Units. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):391-419.
Simon Beck (2006). These Bizarre Fictions: Thought-Experiments, Our Psychology and Our Selves. Philosophical Papers 35 (1):29-54.
David W. Shoemaker (2007). Personal Identity and Practical Concerns. Mind 116 (462):317-357.
Marya Schechtman (2001). Empathic Access: The Missing Ingredient in Personal Identity. Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):95 – 111.
Rory Madden (2011). Intention and the Self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):325-351.
Stephen R. Coleman (2000). Thought Experiments and Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):51-66.
David Shoemaker (2010). The Insignificance of Personal Identity for Bioethics. Bioethics 24 (9):481-489.
Marya Schechtman (2011). Memory and Identity. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):65-79.
Simon Beck (2009). Martha Nussbaum and the Foundations of Ethics: Identity, Morality and Thought-Experiments. South African Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):261-270.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads211 ( #11,511 of 1,789,836 )
Recent downloads (6 months)22 ( #36,535 of 1,789,836 )
How can I increase my downloads?