Rethinking Quine's Argument on the Collapse of Modal Distinctions

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (2):276-294 (1997)
This paper examines and discusses an argument for the collapse of modal distincions offered by Quine in "Reference and Modality" and in Word and Object that relies exclusively on a version of the Principle of Substitution. It is argued that the argument does not affect its historical targets: Carnap's treatment of modality, presented in Meaning and Necessity, and Church's Logic of Sense and Denotation, developed by Kaplan; nor does it affect a treatment of modality inspired in Frege's treatment of oblique contexts. It is argued, nevertheless, that the immunity of those systems to Quine's argument depends on the success of their rejection of the Principle of Substitution presupposed by Quine
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1305/ndjfl/1039724891
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,305
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Michael Kremer (1997). Marti on Descriptions in Carnap's S. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (6):629-634.
Genoveva Marti (1994). Do Modal Distinctions Collapse in Carnap's System? Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (6):575 - 593.
Takashi Yagisawa (2008). Modal Realism with Modal Tense 1. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):309-327.
Lieven Decock (2002). Quine's Weak and Strong Indispensability Argument. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (2):231-250.
Tracy Lupher (2012). A Logical Choice. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):237-246.
Henrik Lagerlund (2009). Avicenna and Ūsī on Modal Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (3):227-239.
Kai Frederick Wehmeier (2004). In the Mood. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (6):607-630.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

17 ( #267,700 of 1,932,596 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #456,397 of 1,932,596 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.