David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophers' Imprint 7 (2):1-5 (2007)
Does the past rationally bear on the future? David Hume argued that we lack good reason to think that it does. He insisted in particular that we lack — and forever will lack — anything like a demonstrative proof of such a rational bearing. A surprising mathematical result can be read as an invitation to reconsider Hume's confidence.
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