Beyond consciousness of external reality: A ''who'' system for consciousness of action and self-consciousness
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):465-477 (1998)
This paper offers a framework for consciousness of internal reality. Recent PET experiments are reviewed, showing partial overlap of cortical activation during self-produced actions and actions observed from other people. This overlap suggests that representations for actions may be shared by several individuals, a situation which creates a potential problem for correctly attributing an action to its agent. The neural conditions for correct agency judgments are thus assigned a key role in self/other distinction and self-consciousness. A series of behavioral experiments that demonstrate, in normal subjects, the poor monitoring of action-related signals and the difficulty in recognizing self-produced actions are described. In patients presenting delusions, this difficulty dramatically increases and actions become systematically misattributed. These results point to schizophrenia and related disorders as a paradigmatic alteration of a ''Who?'' system for self-consciousness
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Shaun Gallagher (2008). Are Minimal Representations Still Representations? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):351 – 369.
Rachel Wood & Susan A. J. Stuart (2009). Aplasic Phantoms and the Mirror Neuron System: An Enactive, Developmental Perspective. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):487-504.
Marc Slors (2010). Neural Resonance: Between Implicit Simulation and Social Perception. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):437-458.
Claudia Carrara Augustenborg (2010). The Endogenous Feedback Network: A New Approach to the Comprehensive Study of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):547-579.
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