David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophers' Imprint 4 (1):1-37 (2004)
A rich tradition in philosophy takes truths about meaning to be wholly determined by how language is used; meanings do not guide use of language from behind the scenes, but instead are fixed by such use. Linguistic practice, on this conception, exhausts the facts to which the project of understanding another must be faithful. But how is linguistic practice to be characterized? No one has addressed this question more seriously than W. V. Quine, who sought for many years to formulate a conception of use that makes sense of certain key features of meaning. The nature, development, and adequacy of his formulations are here explored. All are found to fall short of what he wanted to achieve. Donald Davidson has introduced significant variations on Quine's project. The resulting position is also examined, but likewise found to be problematic. Finally, a neo-Quinean conception is sketched, as are some of the problems such a view would have to surmount.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Martin Gustafsson (2011). Familiar Words in Unfamiliar Surroundings: Davidson's Malapropisms, Cavell's Projections. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (5):643 - 668.
Cheng-Hung Tsai (2002). Generalizing and Normalizing Quine's Epistemology. Philosophical Writings 19:3-21.
M. McDermott (2001). Quine's Holism and Functionalist Holism. Mind 110 (440):977-1025.
Ronald Loeffler (2009). Neo-Pragmatist (Practice-Based) Theories of Meaning. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):197-218.
Cory Juhl (2003). Review of Hans-Johann Glock,, Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and Reality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (11).
Tyrus Fisher (2011). Quine's Behaviorism and Linguistic Meaning: Why Quine's Behaviorism is Not Illicit. Philosophia 39 (1):51-59.
Roger F. Gibson (1994). Quine and Davidson: Two Naturalized Epistemologists. Inquiry 37 (4):449 – 463.
Robert Sinclair (2009). Why Quine is Not an Externalist. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:279-304.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads36 ( #46,583 of 1,098,129 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #283,807 of 1,098,129 )
How can I increase my downloads?