David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Thinking and Reasoning 3 (3):161 – 189 (1997)
Previous studies have shown that 1 participants are reluctant to accept a conclusion as certainly true when it is derived from a valid conditional argument that includes a doubtful premise, and 2 participants typically link the degree of uncertainty found in a given premise set to its conclusion. Two experiments were designed to further investigate these phenomena. Ninety adult participants in Experiment 1 were first asked to judge the validity of three conditional arguments Modus Ponens, Denial of the Antecedent, and Affirmation of the Consequent . They were then required to evaluate conclusion uncertainty as a function of two degrees of asserted uncertainty in the major conditional premise If p then it is very probable that q and if p then it is not very probable that q of the arguments from the first task that were otherwise unchanged. Results revealed an effect for asserted-uncertainty in two of the three argument forms. Marginal support was found for the hypothesis that perceived argument validity would be a predictor of performance. Experiment 2 investigated the way 40 adult participants combined two sources of asserted uncertainty, one in the major premise and another in the minor premise, when they had to score the uncertainty of the conclusion. The two most prominent kinds of responses were to choose the same likelihood as the weaker of the two expressed in the premises, or a lower one. However, the within-subject consistency was poor. Theoretical implications are discussed.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (2009). The Uncertain Reasoner: Bayes, Logic, and Rationality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):105-120.
Similar books and articles
A. J. B. Fugard, Niki Pfeifer, B. Mayerhofer & G. D. Kleiter (2009). How People Interpret an Uncertain If. In T. Kroupa & J. Vejnarova (eds.), Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Uncertainty Processing. 80-91.
Victoria F. Shaw (1996). The Cognitive Processes in Informal Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 2 (1):51 – 80.
Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter (2007). Human Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities: Modus Ponens and Denying the Antecedent. In Proceedings of the 5 T H International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications. 347--356.
Paul Oppenheimer & Edward N. Zalta (2011). A Computationally-Discovered Simplification of the Ontological Argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):333 - 349.
Sara Verbrugge, Kristien Dieussaert, Walter Schaeken, Hans Smessaert & William Van Belle (2007). Pronounced Inferences: A Study on Inferential Conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (2):105 – 133.
Stephane Quinn & Henry Markovits (2002). Conditional Reasoning with Causal Premises: Evidence for a Retrieval Model. Thinking and Reasoning 8 (3):179 – 191.
Kristien Dieussaert, Walter Schaeken, Walter Schroyens & Gery D'Ydewalle (2000). Strategies During Complex Conditional Inferences. Thinking and Reasoning 6 (2):125 – 160.
Guy Politzer (2005). Uncertainty and the Suppression of Inferences. Thinking and Reasoning 11 (1):5 – 33.
Christian George (1999). Evaluation of the Plausibility of a Conclusion Derivable From Several Arguments with Uncertain Premises. Thinking and Reasoning 5 (3):245 – 281.
Rosemary J. Stevenson & David E. Over (2001). Reasoning From Uncertain Premises: Effects of Expertise and Conversational Context. Thinking and Reasoning 7 (4):367 – 390.
Added to index2009-02-08
Total downloads9 ( #155,825 of 1,098,976 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #79,853 of 1,098,976 )
How can I increase my downloads?