David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256 (2003)
This paper argues that there is no such thing as ?phenomenal intentionality?. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to ?what it is like? (WIL) to attend on some occasion to one?s intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of ?phenomenal intentionality? fail to recognize this, but this asymmetry undermines their arguments for phenomenal intentionality. The broader issue driving the advocacy of phenomenal intentionality is the belief that consciousness must somehow be implicated in intentionality. With this I agree. But because of the asymmetry of application of WIL, the path chosen by advocates of phenomenal intentionality to secure this conclusion cannot succeed. A brief overview of recent philosophy of mind explains the temptation to take this wrong path. Fortunately, there are other routes that implicate consciousness in intentionality. In consequence, though there is no phenomenal intentionality, there is a phenomenology of intentionality.
|Keywords||*Consciousness States *Intention *Phenomenology|
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Citations of this work BETA
David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici, Phenomenal Intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
N. Georgalis (2006). Representation and the First-Person Perspective. Synthese 150 (2):281-325.
Nicholas Georgalis (2007). First-Person Methodologies: A View From Outside the Phenomenological Tradition. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):93-112.
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