A defense of the knowledge argument

Philosophical Studies 93 (3):317-336 (1999)
Abstract
This paper calls into question the viability of materialist reduction of the phenomenal. I revisit the 'Knowledge Argument', which claims that there is information about the phenomenal which is not reducible to, nor even inferable from, information about the physical. I demonstrate the failure of the two chief strategies for blocking the Knowledge Argument: (1) analyzing phenomenal knowledge as an ability, and (2) construing it as knowledge of facts which are ontologically reducible to (though conceptually distinct from) physical facts. Materialist reduction of the phenomenal is, thus, untenable; materialists must adopt a more extreme, eliminativist view about the phenomenal
Keywords Ability  Knowledge  Materialism  Metaphysics  Mind  Conee, E  Lewis, D  Tye, M
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