David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 9 (1):47-53 (2002)
Cognitive neuropsychiatry (CN) is the explanation of psychiatric disorder by the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. Within CN there are, broadly speaking, two approaches to delusion. The first uses a one-stage model, in which delusions are explained as rationalizations of anomalous experiences via reasoning strategies that are not, in themselves, abnormal. Two-stage models invoke additional hypotheses about abnormalities of reasoning. In this paper, I examine what appears to be a very strong argument, developed within CN, in favor of a twostage explanation of the difference in content between the Capgras and Cotard delusions. That explanation treats them as alternative rationalizations of essentially the same phenomenology. I show, however, that once we distinguish the phenomenology (and the neuroetiology), a one-stage model is adequate. In the final section I make some more general remarks on the oneand two-stage models
|Keywords||Delusion Ethics Explanation Pathology Psychology Cotard, J|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Marga Reimer (2009). Is the Impostor Hypothesis Really so Preposterous? Understanding the Capgras Experience. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):669 – 686.
Garry Young (2011). Beliefs, Experiences and Misplaced Being: An Interactionist Account of Delusional Misidentification. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):195-215.
Similar books and articles
David Cohen & Angèle Consoli (2006). Production of Supernatural Beliefs During Cotard's Syndrome, a Rare Psychotic Depression. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):468-470.
Andrew W. Young (1999). Delusions. The Monist 82 (4):571-589.
Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Timothy J. Bayne (2006). Phenomenology and Delusions: Who Put the 'Alien' in Alien Control? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.
Andy Egan (2008). Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception. In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.
Martin Davies & Max Coltheart (2000). Pathologies of Belief. Mind and Language 15:1-46.
Garry Young (2008). Restating the Role of Phenomenal Experience in the Formation and Maintenance of the Capgras Delusion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):177-189.
Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2004). Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):1-11.
Philip Gerrans (2000). Refining the Explanation of Cotard's Delusion. Mind and Language 15 (1):111-122.
Philip Gerrans (2001). Delusions as Performance Failures. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 6 (3).
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads156 ( #6,531 of 1,679,366 )
Recent downloads (6 months)55 ( #1,689 of 1,679,366 )
How can I increase my downloads?