David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 9 (1):47-53 (2002)
Cognitive neuropsychiatry (CN) is the explanation of psychiatric disorder by the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. Within CN there are, broadly speaking, two approaches to delusion. The first uses a one-stage model, in which delusions are explained as rationalizations of anomalous experiences via reasoning strategies that are not, in themselves, abnormal. Two-stage models invoke additional hypotheses about abnormalities of reasoning. In this paper, I examine what appears to be a very strong argument, developed within CN, in favor of a twostage explanation of the difference in content between the Capgras and Cotard delusions. That explanation treats them as alternative rationalizations of essentially the same phenomenology. I show, however, that once we distinguish the phenomenology (and the neuroetiology), a one-stage model is adequate. In the final section I make some more general remarks on the oneand two-stage models
|Keywords||Delusion Ethics Explanation Pathology Psychology Cotard, J|
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Citations of this work BETA
Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2005). In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.
Robert J. Howell & Brad Thompson (forthcoming). Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
Alexandre Billon (2015). Why Are We Certain That We Exist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):723-759.
Glenn Carruthers (2008). Types of Body Representation and the Sense of Embodiment. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1302):1316.
Jakob Hohwy & Raben Rosenberg (2005). Unusual Experiences, Reality Testing and Delusions of Alien Control. Mind and Language 20 (2):141-162.
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