David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):565 – 589 (2006)
Whether or not one endorses realism about colour, it is very tempting to regard realism about determinable colours such as green and yellow as standing or falling together with realism about determinate colours such as unique green or green31. Indeed some of the most prominent representatives of both sides of the colour realism debate explicitly endorse the idea that these two kinds of realism are so linked. Against such theorists, the present paper argues that one can be a realist about the determinable colours of objects, and thus hold that most of the colour ascriptions made by competent speakers are literally true, while denying that there are any positive facts of the matter as to the determinate colours of objects. The result is a realistic colour realism that can certify most of our everyday colour ascriptions as literally correct, while acknowledging the data regarding individual variation
|Keywords||color determinable perception conflicting appearances|
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References found in this work BETA
Edward W. Averill (1992). The Relational Nature of Color. Philosophical Review 101 (3):551-88.
Edward Wilson Averill (2003). Perceptual Variation and Access to Colors. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-22.
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Citations of this work BETA
Joshua Gert (2009). Toward an Epistemology of Certain Substantive a Priori Truths. Metaphilosophy 40 (2):214-236.
Joshua Gert (2009). Colour, Emotion and Objectivity. Analysis 69 (4):714-721.
Joshua Gert (2010). Color Constancy, Complexity, and Counterfactual. Noûs 44 (4):669-690.
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