Graduate studies at Western
Cambridge University Press (2004)
|Abstract||Joshua Gert presents a new account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. He argues that, rather than simply "counting in favor of" action, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles--that of requiring action and that of justifying action. Gert's book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reasoning in particular, and moral theory more generally.|
|Keywords||Normativity (Ethics Decision making Moral and ethical aspects|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$24.60 used (79% off) $90.13 new (21% off) $103.26 direct from Amazon (10% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1458.3.G47 2004|
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