Color constancy and the color/value analogy

Ethics 121 (1):58-87 (2010)
This article explains and defends the existence of value constancy, understood on the model of color constancy. Color constancy involves a phenomenal distinction between the transient color appearances of objects and the unchanging colors that those objects appear to have. The existence of value constancy allows advocates of response-dependent accounts of value to reject the question “What is the uniquely appropriate attitude to have toward this evaluative property?” as containing a false uniqueness assumption. Rejecting this assumption allows response-dependent accounts of value to deflect or answer a host of popular objections
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Joshua Gert (2013). Color Constancy and Dispositionalism. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):183-200.

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