Graduate studies at Western
Noûs 36 (1):22-49 (2002)
|Abstract||My aim here is threefold: (a) to show that conceptual facts play a more significant role in justifying explanatory reductions than most of the contributors to the current debate realize; (b) to furnish an account of that role, and (c) to trace the consequences of this account for conceivability arguments about the mind.|
|Keywords||Conceivability Conceptual Analysis Explanation Metaphysics Mind Reduction|
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