Explanatory reduction, conceptual analysis, and conceivability arguments about the mind

Noûs 36 (1):22-49 (2002)
Abstract
My aim here is threefold: (a) to show that conceptual facts play a more significant role in justifying explanatory reductions than most of the contributors to the current debate realize; (b) to furnish an account of that role, and (c) to trace the consequences of this account for conceivability arguments about the mind.
Keywords Conceivability  Conceptual Analysis  Explanation  Metaphysics  Mind  Reduction
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Gordon Prescott Barnes (2007). Necessity and Apriority. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):495 - 523.
Louis deRosset (2010). Reference and Response. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99999 (1):1-18.

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