David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):121-141 (2008)
Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind (ToM) has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest since it suggests a parsimonious cognitive architecture can account for apparent domain specificity. We argue for such an architecture in two stages. First, on conceptual grounds, contrasting the case of language with ToM, and second, by showing that recent evidence in the form of fMRI and lesion studies supports the more parsimonious hypothesis. Theory of Mind, Metarepresentation, and Modularity Developmental Components of ToM The Analogy with Modularity of Language Dissociations without Modules The Evidence from Neuroscience Conclusion CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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Philip S. Gerrans (2013). Imitation, Mind Reading, and Social Learning. Biological Theory 8 (1):20-27.
Dustin Stokes & Vincent Bergeron (2015). Modular Architectures and Informational Encapsulation: A Dilemma. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (3):315-38.
Marcus P. Adams (2013). Explaining the Theory of Mind Deficit in Autism Spectrum Disorder. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):233-249.
Meredith R. Wilkinson & Linden J. Ball (2012). Why Studies of Autism Spectrum Disorders Have Failed to Resolve the Theory Theory Versus Simulation Theory Debate. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):263-291.
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