Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony

Abstract
Is the nature of testimonial warrant epistemically internalist or externalist? I will argue that the question should be answered ‘yes!’ The disjunction is not exclusive. Rather, a testimonial belief may possess epistemically internalist warrant—justification—as well as epistemically externalist warrant—entitlement. I use the label ‘pluralism’ to denote the view that there are both internalist and externalist species of genuinely epistemic warrant and argue for pluralism in the epistemology of testimony.
Keywords Testimony  Epistemic externalism  Anti-individualism  Social Epistemology
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References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1993). Content Preservation. Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
Tyler Burge (2003). Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.

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Albert Casullo (2007). What is Entitlement? Acta Analytica 22 (4):267 - 279.
Paul Faulkner (1998). David Hume's Reductionist Epistemology of Testimony. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):302–313.
Deborah Tollefsen (2007). Group Testimony. Social Epistemology 21 (3):299 – 311.
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