Is internalism about knowledge consistent with content externalism?

Philosophia 36 (1):87-96 (2008)
There is widespread suspicion that there is a principled conflict between epistemic internalism and content externalism (or anti-individualism). Despite the prominence of this suspicion, it has rarely been substantiated by explicit arguments. However, Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup have recently provided a prima facie argument concluding that internalism about knowledge and externalism about content are incompatible. I criticize the incompatibilist argument and conclude that the purported incompatibility is, at best, prima facie. This is, in part, because several steps in the argument are faulty and, in part, because there are promising responses available to the compatibilists
Keywords Anti-individualism  Internalism  Externalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-007-9095-3
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,707
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Keith Butler (1997). Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800.
Ana Gavran (2004). Tim Crane on the Internalism-Externalism Debate. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):207-218.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

69 ( #49,355 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #99,332 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.