Is internalism about knowledge consistent with content externalism?

Philosophia 36 (1):87-96 (2008)
There is widespread suspicion that there is a principled conflict between epistemic internalism and content externalism (or anti-individualism). Despite the prominence of this suspicion, it has rarely been substantiated by explicit arguments. However, Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup have recently provided a prima facie argument concluding that internalism about knowledge and externalism about content are incompatible. I criticize the incompatibilist argument and conclude that the purported incompatibility is, at best, prima facie. This is, in part, because several steps in the argument are faulty and, in part, because there are promising responses available to the compatibilists
Keywords Anti-individualism  Internalism  Externalism
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    B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
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