David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28 (2001)
This paper defends a novel account of how we introspect phenomenal states, the Demonstrative Attention account (DA). First, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal state introspection which are not psychological, but purely metaphysical and semantic. Next, to explain how these conditions can be satisfied, I describe how demonstrative reference to a phenomenal content can be achieved through attention alone. This sort of introspective demonstration differs from perceptual demonstration in being non-causal. DA nicely explains key intuitions about phenomenal self-knowledge, makes possible an appealing diagnosis of blindsight cases, and yields a highly plausible view as to the extent of our first-person epistemic privilege. Because these virtues stem from construing phenomenal properties as non-relational features of states, my defense of DA constitutes a challenge to relational construals of phenomenal properties, including functionalism and representationalism. And I provide reason to doubt that they can meet this challenge.
|Keywords||Condition Epistemology Knowledge Metaphysics Phenomenon State|
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Citations of this work BETA
Ali Hasan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism, Classical Foundationalism, and Internalist Justification. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141.
Sean Allen‐Hermanson (2015). Introspection, Anton's Syndrome, and Human Echolocation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):n/a-n/a.
Erhan Demircioglu (2013). Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.
Ted Poston (2014). Direct Phenomenal Beliefs, Cognitive Significance, and the Specious Present. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):483-489.
John Dilworth (2006). Perception, Introspection, and Functional Consonance. Theoria 72 (4):299-318.
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