Graduate studies at Western
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):312-324 (2008)
|Abstract||Abstract: The point of this paper is to undermine the support that particularism in the domain of epistemic reasons might seem to give to particularism in the domain of practical reasons. In the epistemic domain, there are two related notions: truth and the rationality of belief. Epistemic reasons are related to the rationality of belief, and not directly to truth. In the domain of practical reasons, however, the role of truth is taken by the notion of objective rationality. Practical reasons are directly relevant to this objective notion, and therefore the reasons to expect holism and particularism in the epistemic domain do not transfer to the domain of practical rationality.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Joshua Gert (2005). A Functional Role Analysis of Reasons. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):353 - 378.
Brendan Larvor (2008). Moral Particularism and Scientific Practice. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):492-507.
Michael Smith (2007). Is There a Nexus Between Reasons and Rationality? Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):279-298.
María Cristina Redondo (2005). Legal Reasons: Between Universalism and Particularism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 2 (1):47-68.
Matthew S. Bedke (2008). Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (1):85 - 111.
Vojko Strahovnik (2004). The Riddle of Aesthetic Principles. Acta Analytica 19 (33):189-208.
Alan Thomas (2011). Another Particularism: Reasons, Status and Defaults. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):151-167.
Andrew Reisner (2007). Evidentialism and the Numbers Game. Theoria 73 (4):304-316.
Christian Piller (2006). Particularism and the Structure of Reasons. Acta Analytica 21 (2):87-102.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads49 ( #25,847 of 739,347 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,538 of 739,347 )
How can I increase my downloads?