David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):312-324 (2008)
Abstract: The point of this paper is to undermine the support that particularism in the domain of epistemic reasons might seem to give to particularism in the domain of practical reasons. In the epistemic domain, there are two related notions: truth and the rationality of belief. Epistemic reasons are related to the rationality of belief, and not directly to truth. In the domain of practical reasons, however, the role of truth is taken by the notion of objective rationality. Practical reasons are directly relevant to this objective notion, and therefore the reasons to expect holism and particularism in the epistemic domain do not transfer to the domain of practical rationality.
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References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Harvard University Press.
Derek Parfit (2011). On What Matters. Oxford University Press.
Richard B. Brandt (1998). A Theory of the Good and the Right. Prometheus Books.
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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu (forthcoming). Can the Canberrans’ Supervenience Argument Refute Shapeless Moral Particularism? Erkenntnis:1-16.
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