Simulation theory on conceptual grounds
Protosociology 20:261-284 (2004)
| Abstract | I will present a conceptual argument for a simulationist answer to (2). Given that our conception of mental states is employed in attributing mental states to others, a simulationist answer to (2) supports a simulationist answer to (1). I will not address question (3). Answers to (1) and (2) do not yield an answer to (3), since (1) and (2) concern only our actual practices and concepts. For instance, an error theory about (1) and (2) would say that our practices and concepts manifest a mistaken view about the real nature of the mental. Finally, I will not address question (2a), which is an empirical question and so is not immediately relevant to the conceptual argument that is of concern here | |||||||||
| Keywords | Belief Desire Epistemology Simulation Theory | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links | This entry has no external links. Add one. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesMitchell Herschbach (2012). Mirroring Versus Simulation: On the Representational Function of Simulation. Synthese 189 (3):483-513.
Robert M. Gordon & Joe Cruz (2002). Simulation Theory. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
Frank Jackson (1999). All That Can Be at Issue in the Theory-Theory/Simulation Debate. Philosophical Papers 28 (2):77-96.
Justin C. Fisher (2006). Does Simulation Theory Really Involve Simulation? Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):417 – 432.
Jan Almäng (2007). Intentionality and Intersubjectivity. Göteborgs Universitet.
Bill Wringe (2009). Simulation, Theory and Collapse. Erkenntnis 71 (2):223 - 232.
Josef Perner & Johannes L. Brandl (2009). Simulation à la Goldman: Pretend and Collapse. Philosophical Studies 144 (3).
Analytics
Monthly downloads
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
|
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads0Recent downloads (6 months)0How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
