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- Heather J. Gert (1999). The Death Penalty and Victims' Rights: Legal Advance Directives. Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (4).
Discussion of Heather J. Gert, The death penalty and victims' rights: Legal advance directives
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A challenge has recently been levelled against the legal and/or moral legitimacy of some advance directives. It has been argued that in certain cases an advance directive carries no weight in a decision on whether to withhold treatment, since the individual in the debilitating state is not the same person as the person who created the advance directive. In the first section of this paper, I examine two formulations of the argument against the moral legitimacy of the advance directives under (...)


