Philosophical Topics 28 (2):125-46 (2000)
|Abstract||It is often said that we can know our own thoughts more directly or with more certainty than anyone else can know them. And this disparity is usually taken to be principled, in that we would not be the rational, reflective beings that we are without it. My aim is to trace the consequences of a principled disparity between self-knowledge and other-knowledge for what may be termed the “mechanics ” of self-knowledge . I use a new thought experiment to show that if introspective states are merely causally related to introspected thoughts, the disparity between self-knowledge and other-knowledge is not truly principled. An account of self-knowledge adequate to a truly principled disparity will allow that thought tokens can be.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2007). Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It so Well? Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.
Francois-Igor Pris, The Instinctive Knowledge Without the Reflective Knowledge, and Vice Versa (in Russian).
Klemens Kappel (2010). Expressivism About Knowledge and the Value of Knowledge. Acta Analytica 25 (2):175-194.
Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2008). Self-Knowledge: Rationalism Vs. Empiricism. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352.
Matthew Boyle (2009). Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.
Huiming Ren (2012). The Distinction Between Knowledge-That and Knowledge-How. Philosophia 40 (4):857-875.
Sarah Sawyer (1999). Am Externalist Account of Introspectve Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 4 (4):358-78.
Brie Gertler, Self-Knowledge. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads59 ( #16,382 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #7,667 of 548,984 )
How can I increase my downloads?