David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Topics 28 (2):125-46 (2000)
It is often said that we can know our own thoughts more directly or with more certainty than anyone else can know them. And this disparity is usually taken to be principled, in that we would not be the rational, reflective beings that we are without it. My aim is to trace the consequences of a principled disparity between self-knowledge and other-knowledge for what may be termed the “mechanics ” of self-knowledge . I use a new thought experiment to show that if introspective states are merely causally related to introspected thoughts, the disparity between self-knowledge and other-knowledge is not truly principled. An account of self-knowledge adequate to a truly principled disparity will allow that thought tokens can be.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Heather Logue (2011). The Skeptic and the Naïve Realist. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):268-288.
Matthew Kennedy (2011). Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Noûs 45 (1):77-102.
Sven Bernecker (2009). Self-Knowledge and the Bounds of Authenticity. Erkenntnis 71 (1):107 - 121.
John Dilworth (2006). Perception, Introspection, and Functional Consonance. Theoria 72 (4):299-318.
Similar books and articles
Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2007). Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It so Well? Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.
Klemens Kappel (2010). Expressivism About Knowledge and the Value of Knowledge. Acta Analytica 25 (2):175-194.
Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2008). Self-Knowledge: Rationalism Vs. Empiricism. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352.
Matthew Boyle (2009). Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.
Huiming Ren (2012). The Distinction Between Knowledge-That and Knowledge-How. Philosophia 40 (4):857-875.
Sarah Sawyer (1999). Am Externalist Account of Introspectve Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 4 (4):358-78.
Brie Gertler, Self-Knowledge. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads79 ( #18,248 of 1,099,957 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #51,477 of 1,099,957 )
How can I increase my downloads?