David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 13 (1):56-75 (1998)
Once the notion of a precursive relationship between developmental stages is fully articulated in terms of the distinction between ‘role’ and ‘realiser’ states, it turns out that the ‘Theory of Mind’ literature operates with a notion of precursive relationships described at too high a level of abstraction to explain actual mechanisms of development. Furthermore, the tendency within that literature to explain precursive relationships in terms of role states with isomorphic linguistic/computational structures is misleading. Developmental relationships are more likely to exist between states which play a similar normative role in the agents’s psychology than between states which can be described as sharing a similar computational architecture
|Keywords||Cognition Computation Development Language Mind|
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