The surprise examination in dynamic epistemic logic

Synthese 155 (1):21 - 33 (2007)
We examine the paradox of the surprise examination using dynamic epistemic logic. This logic contains means of expressing epistemic facts as well as the effects of learning new facts, and is therefore a natural framework for representing the puzzle. We discuss a number of different interpretations of the puzzle in this context, and show how the failure of principle of success, that states that sentences, when learned, remain to be true and come to be believed, plays a central role in understanding the puzzle.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.2307/27653476
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References found in this work BETA
Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Blindspots. Oxford University Press.
Frank Veltman (1996). Defaults in Update Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):221 - 261.

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Ken Levy (2009). The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.

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