The surprise examination in dynamic epistemic logic

Synthese 155 (1):21 - 33 (2007)
Abstract
We examine the paradox of the surprise examination using dynamic epistemic logic. This logic contains means of expressing epistemic facts as well as the effects of learning new facts, and is therefore a natural framework for representing the puzzle. We discuss a number of different interpretations of the puzzle in this context, and show how the failure of principle of success, that states that sentences, when learned, remain to be true and come to be believed, plays a central role in understanding the puzzle.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,561
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Jelle Gerbrandy & Willem Groeneveld (1997). Reasoning About Information Change. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (2):147-169.
D. Kaplan & R. Montague (1960). A Paradox Regained. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1 (3):79-90.

View all 10 references

Citations of this work BETA
Ken Levy (2009). The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

27 ( #62,756 of 1,098,129 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #78,521 of 1,098,129 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.