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Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age
Cognition 56 (2):165-193 (1995)
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Citations of this work
Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition.Kristin Andrews - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1):36-56.
Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor's reach.A. Woodward - 1998 - Cognition 69 (1):1-34.
Acting intentionally and the side-effect effect: 'Theory of mind' and moral judgment.Joshua Knobe, Adam Cohen & Alan Leslie - 2006 - Psychological Science 17:421-427.
What makes human cognition unique? From individual to shared to collective intentionality.Michael Tomasello & Hannes Rakoczy - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (2):121-147.
References found in this work
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?David Premack & G. Woodruff - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):515-629.
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?David Premack & Guy Woodruff - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):515-526.
Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”?Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie & Uta Frith - 1985 - Cognition 21 (1):37-46.
Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception.H. Wimmer - 1983 - Cognition 13 (1):103-128.
Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of mind.".Alan M. Leslie - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (4):412-426.
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