David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Bioethics 24 (4):153-159 (2010)
In this paper I examine the question of whether ethicists are moral experts. I call people moral experts if their moral judgments are correct with high probability and for the right reasons. I defend three theses, while developing a version of the coherence theory of moral justification based on the differences between moral and nonmoral experience: The answer to the question of whether there are moral experts depends on the answer to the question of how to justify moral judgments. Deductivism and the coherence theory both provide some support for the opinion that moral experts exist in some way. I maintain – within the framework of a certain kind of coherence theory – that moral philosophers are 'semi-experts'.
|Keywords||moral experts coherence theory deductive theories|
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Regina A. Rini (2014). Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):169-181.
Nicky Priaulx (2011). Vorsprung Durch Technik: On Biotechnology, Bioethics, and Its Beneficiaries. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 20 (2):174-184.
Alan Cribb (2011). Beyond the Classroom Wall: Theorist-Practitioner Relationships and Extra-Mural Ethics. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):383-396.
Cletus T. Andoh (2013). Bioethics Education in Africa: Still Complex Challenges. Open Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):507.
Nicky Priaulx, Martin Weinel & Anthony Wrigley (forthcoming). Rethinking Moral Expertise. Health Care Analysis:1-14.
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