Logical reasoning

Abstract In the psychological literature on reasoning it has always been assumed that if there is such a thing as mental logic, it must be a set of inference rules. This proof-theoretic conception of mental logic is compatible with but doesn’t do justice to what, according to most logicians, logic is about. Thus, the ongoing debate over mental logic is based on a too narrow notion of logic. Adopting the broader perspective suggested by the standard (Tarskian) view on logic helps to clarify the debate and also shows that the case for mental logic is much stronger than its critics would have us believe.
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