David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Systematic Zoology 23:536-44 (1974)
Traditionally, species (like other taxa) have been treated as classes (universals). In fact they may be considered individuals (particular things). The logical term “individual” has been confused with a biological synonym for “organism.” If species are individuals, then: 1) their names are proper, 2) there cannot be instances of them, 3) they do not have defining properties (intensions), 4) their constituent organisms are parts, not members. “Species" may be defined as the most extensive units in the natural economy such that reproductive competition occurs among their parts. Species are to evolutionary theory as firms are to economic theory: this analogy resolves many issues, such as the problems of “reality” and the ontological status of nomenclatorial types.
|Keywords||Natural Kinds Species Philosophy of biology Ontology Evolutionary theory|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Sonia Roca-Royes (2011). Essential Properties and Individual Essences. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):65-77.
Joel Cracraft (1987). Species Concepts and the Ontology of Evolution. Biology and Philosophy 2 (3):329-346.
Michael T. Ghiselin (1988). The Individuality Thesis, Essences, and Laws of Nature. Biology and Philosophy 3 (4):467-474.
Makmiller Pedroso (2012). Essentialism, History, and Biological Taxa. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (1):182-190.
Sarah S. Richardson (2010). Sexes, Species, and Genomes: Why Males and Females Are Not Like Humans and Chimpanzees. Biology and Philosophy 25 (5):823-841.
Similar books and articles
Mark Ridley (1989). The Cladistic Solution to the Species Problem. Biology and Philosophy 4 (1):1-16.
Joseph LaPorte (2003). Does a Type Specimen Necessarily or Contingently Belong to its Species? Biology and Philosophy 18 (4):583-588.
Thomas Reydon (2009). How to Fix Kind Membership: A Problem for Hpc Theory and a Solution. Philosophy of Science 76 (5):724-736.
G. McOuat (2001). From Cutting Nature at its Joints to Measuring It: New Kinds and New Kinds of People in Biology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 32 (4):613-645.
Marc Ereshefsky (2010). Darwin's Solution to the Species Problem. Synthese 175 (3):405 - 425.
Martin Mahner (1993). What Is a Species? A Contribution to the Never Ending Species Debate in Biology. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 24 (1):103 - 126.
Neil E. Williams (2011). Arthritis and Nature's Joints. In Michael O'Rourke, Joseph Keim Campbell & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints. Mit Press.
David B. Kitts & David J. Kitts (1979). Biological Species as Natural Kinds. Philosophy of Science 46 (4):613-622.
Michael Ruse (1987). Biological Species: Natural Kinds, Individuals, or What? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):225-242.
Added to index2009-08-21
Total downloads190 ( #3,078 of 1,101,622 )
Recent downloads (6 months)125 ( #290 of 1,101,622 )
How can I increase my downloads?