Graduate studies at Western
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):573-574 (1998)
|Abstract||Atran's treatment of classification suggests a need to recognize the difference between ontological categories and less metaphysically fundamental distinctions. The shift that scientists have made from classes to individuals may not be as pervasive as he proposes, and the same may be said for the abandonment of essences. It is also possible that the sort of causality that is of concern to scientists plays a role in folk classification.|
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