Synthese 117 (3):355-374 (1998)
|Abstract||First, language and axioms of Church's paper 'Comparison of Russell's Resolution of the Semantical Antinomies with that of Tarski' are slightly modified and a version of the Liar paradox tentatively reconstructed. An obvious natural solution of the paradox leads to a hierarchy of truth predicates which is of a different kind from the one defined by Church: it depends on the enlargement of the semantical vocabulary and its levels do not differ in the ramified-type-theoretical sense. Second, two attempts are made in order to justify the Russellian, and perhaps Churchian, idea that language should not be fragmented beyond what is required by type distinctions. After all, because of reducibility, which seems to allow a semantics without propositions, this comes out to be possible only at the cost of resorting to two disputable theses.|
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