David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Prolegomena 8 (2):141-158 (2009)
The paradox of knowability and the debate about it are shortly presented. Some assumptions which appear more or less tacitly involved in its discussion are made explicit. They are embedded and integrated in a Russellian framework, where a formal paradox, very similar to the Russell-Myhill paradox, is derived. Its solution is provided within a Russellian formal logic introduced by A. Church. It follows that knowledge should be typed. Some relevant aspects of the typing of knowledge are pointed out
|Keywords||Church Fitch paradox of knowability Russell|
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Paolo Maffezioli, Alberto Naibo & Sara Negri (2013). The Church–Fitch Knowability Paradox in the Light of Structural Proof Theory. Synthese 190 (14):2677-2716.
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