The Paradox of Knowability from a Russellian Perspective

Prolegomena 8 (2):141-158 (2009)
The paradox of knowability and the debate about it are shortly presented. Some assumptions which appear more or less tacitly involved in its discussion are made explicit. They are embedded and integrated in a Russellian framework, where a formal paradox, very similar to the Russell-Myhill paradox, is derived. Its solution is provided within a Russellian formal logic introduced by A. Church. It follows that knowledge should be typed. Some relevant aspects of the typing of knowledge are pointed out
Keywords Church  Fitch  paradox of knowability  Russell
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