Access externalism

Mind 115 (457):19-39 (2006)
This paper argues for externalism about justification on the basis of thought experiments. I present cases in which two individuals are intrinsically and introspectively indistinguishable and in which intuitively, one is justified in believing that p while the other is not. I also examine an argument for internalism based on the ideas that we have privileged access to whether or not our own beliefs are justified and that only internalism is compatible with this privilege. I isolate what I take to be the most plausible form of privileged access to justification and show that it is compatible with externalism.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzl019
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Errol Lord (2014). The Coherent and the Rational. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):151-175.
David Christensen (2010). Rational Reflection. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.
Errol Lord (2010). Having Reasons and the Factoring Account. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):283 - 296.

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