Contingent identity

Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):187-222 (1975)
Identities formed with proper names may be contingent. this claim is made first through an example. the paper then develops a theory of the semantics of concrete things, with contingent identity as a consequence. this general theory lets concrete things be made up canonically from fundamental physical entities. it includes theories of proper names, variables, cross-world identity with respect to a sortal, and modal and dispositional properties. the theory, it is argued, is coherent and superior to its rivals, in that it stems naturally from a systematic picture of the physical world
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References found in this work BETA
P. T. Geach (1962/1968). Reference and Generality. Ithaca, N.Y.,Cornell University Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1971). Identity and Necessity. In Milton K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York University Press 135-164.

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Citations of this work BETA
Louis deRosset (2011). What is the Grounding Problem? Philosophical Studies 156 (2):173-197.
Delia Graff Fara (2009). Dear Haecceitism. Erkenntnis 70 (3):285 - 297.

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