Externalism and knowledge of content

Philsophical Review 105 (3):287-310 (1996)
Many bclicvc that content cxtcrnalism is inconsistent with commonscnsc views about our kmowlcdgc of thc contents of our own thoughts} Content cxtcrnalism is thc vicw that thc propositional contents of an individual’s thoughts do not supcrvcnc on thc intrinsic properties of that individual. Relations bctwccn you and your social and physical environment partly dctcrminc thc comtents of your thoughts.? But if what dctcrmimcs thc content of your thoughts lics partly outside your mind, it might sccm that you have to investigate your social and physical cnvironmcnt bcforc you can know thc content of your thoughts. If such investigation were nccessary, our kmowlcdgc of our own mind would bc much lcss direct and much lcss warranted than we ordinarily bclicvc. How do wc connect content cxtcrnalism with failures of sclf-
Keywords Content  Epistemology  Externalism  Knowledge  Self-knowledge
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DOI 10.2307/2185702
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Laura Schroeter (2007). Illusion of Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):597 – 618.

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