David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philsophical Review 105 (3):287-310 (1996)
Many bclicvc that content cxtcrnalism is inconsistent with commonscnsc views about our kmowlcdgc of thc contents of our own thoughts} Content cxtcrnalism is thc vicw that thc propositional contents of an individual’s thoughts do not supcrvcnc on thc intrinsic properties of that individual. Relations bctwccn you and your social and physical environment partly dctcrminc thc comtents of your thoughts.? But if what dctcrmimcs thc content of your thoughts lics partly outside your mind, it might sccm that you have to investigate your social and physical cnvironmcnt bcforc you can know thc content of your thoughts. If such investigation were nccessary, our kmowlcdgc of our own mind would bc much lcss direct and much lcss warranted than we ordinarily bclicvc. How do wc connect content cxtcrnalism with failures of sclf-
|Keywords||Content Epistemology Externalism Knowledge Self-knowledge|
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Citations of this work BETA
Sven Bernecker (2004). Memory and Externalism. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605-632.
Sven Bernecker (2011). Further Thoughts on Memory: Replies to Schechtman, Adams, and Goldberg. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):109-121.
Jessica Brown (2004). Wright on Transmission Failure. Analysis 64 (1):57–67.
Laura Schroeter (2007). Illusion of Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):597 – 618.
Sanford C. Goldberg (2007). Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive Justification. Nos 41 (2):178ï¿½203.
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