Externalism and knowledge of content

Philsophical Review 105 (3):287-310 (1996)
Abstract
Many bclicvc that content cxtcrnalism is inconsistent with commonscnsc views about our kmowlcdgc of thc contents of our own thoughts} Content cxtcrnalism is thc vicw that thc propositional contents of an individual’s thoughts do not supcrvcnc on thc intrinsic properties of that individual. Relations bctwccn you and your social and physical environment partly dctcrminc thc comtents of your thoughts.? But if what dctcrmimcs thc content of your thoughts lics partly outside your mind, it might sccm that you have to investigate your social and physical cnvironmcnt bcforc you can know thc content of your thoughts. If such investigation were nccessary, our kmowlcdgc of our own mind would bc much lcss direct and much lcss warranted than we ordinarily bclicvc. How do wc connect content cxtcrnalism with failures of sclf-
Keywords Content  Epistemology  Externalism  Knowledge  Self-knowledge
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,346
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Sven Bernecker (2004). Memory and Externalism. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605-632.
Sanford Goldberg (2010). The Metasemantics of Memory. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):95-107.
Laura Schroeter (2007). Illusion of Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):597 – 618.

View all 12 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

21 ( #78,099 of 1,096,620 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #38,815 of 1,096,620 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.