Externalism and knowledge of the attitudes

Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):13-28 (2001)
Abstract
Knowledge of your own propositional attitudes requires at least two things. You need to know the content of the relevant mental state, and you need to know what attitude you take towards that content. If it is possible to mistake a wish for a belief, this is a mistake about the attitude, not the content. One need not believe that we are generally infallible about our mental states to hold that, typically, when I sincerely say..
Keywords Attitude  Content  Context  Epistemology  Externalism  Knowledge
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    References found in this work BETA
    Paul Boghossian (1989). Content and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.
    A. Goldman (1993). The Psychology of Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
    John Heil (1988). Privileged Access. Mind 98 (April):238-51.

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