Normative and recognitional concepts
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):151-167 (2002)
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Svein Eng (2000). Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions. The Concepts of 'Descriptive Proposition' and 'Normative Proposition' as Concepts of Degree. Ratio Juris 13 (3):236-260.
Stephen Finlay (2010). Normativity, Necessity and Tense: A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 5. Oxford University Press.
Terence E. Horgan (1998). Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession. Philosophical Issues 9:27-33.
Darragh Byrne (2004). The 'Compositional Rigidity' of Recognitionality. Philosophical Papers 33 (2):147-169.
Ralph Wedgwood (2003). Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly. In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press.
Richard E. Grandy (1998). Recognitional Concepts and Compositionality. Philosophical Issues 9:21-25.
Jerry A. Fodor (1998). There Are No Recognitional Concepts, Not Even RED. Philosophical Issues 9:1-14.
Mark Textor (2009). 'Demonstrative' Colour Concepts: Recognition Versus Preservation. Ratio 22 (2):234-249.
Ruth G. Millikan (1998). A More Plausible Kind of "Recognitional Concept". Philosophical Issues 9:35-41.
Bradley Rives (2010). Concepts and Perceptual Belief: How (Not) to Defend Recognitional Concepts. Acta Analytica 25 (4):369-391.
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