On 'ravens and relevance' and a likelihood solution of the paradox of confirmation

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (1):75-80 (1969)
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References found in this work

The theory of probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley,: University of California Press.
Meaning and scientific change.Dudley Shapere - 1966 - In R. Colodny (ed.), Mind and Cosmos: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 41--85.
On the "meaning" of scientific terms.Paul K. Feyerabend - 1965 - Journal of Philosophy 62 (10):266-274.
The paradox of confirmation.J. L. Mackie - 1963 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (52):265-276.
Consistency, derivability, and scientific change.Arthur I. Fine - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (8):231-240.

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