Quine and Davidson: Two naturalized epistemologists

Inquiry 37 (4):449 – 463 (1994)
I juxtapose Quine's and Davidson's approaches to naturalized epistemology and assess Davidson's reasons for rejecting Quine's account of the nature of knowledge. Davidson argues that Quine's account of the nature of knowledge is Cartesian in spirit and consequence, i.e. it is essentially first person and invites global skepticism. I survey Quine's response to Davidson's criticisms and suggest that the view that Davidson criticizes may not be Quine's after all. I conclude by raising some questions about Quine's definition of ?observation sentence?
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DOI 10.1080/00201749408602367
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1990). Norms and Aims. In The Pursuit of Truth. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
W. V. O. Quine (1975). Verbal Dispositions. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Clarendon Press

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