Truth and correct belief

Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350 (2005)
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Aiming, Metaethics, Belief, Dissertation
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DOI 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2005.00070.x
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Horwich (2005). Truth. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press 261-272.

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Pascal Engel (2013). Doxastic Correctness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.

View all 29 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Franz Huber (2009). Belief and Degrees of Belief. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer
Conor McHugh (2012). Belief and Aims. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.
David J. Owens (2003). Does Belief Have an Aim? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.
Daniel Whiting (2012). Does Belief Aim at the Truth? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

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