David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 144 (2):297 - 311 (2009)
Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elements or presuppose facts about diachronic personal identity—facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies. The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, not an epistemological one.
|Keywords||Quasi-memory Psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity Diachronic personal identity Personal identity|
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Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
David Lewis (1979). Attitudes de Dicto and de Se. Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Sydney Shoemaker (1970). Persons and Their Pasts. American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (4):269-85.
Sydney Shoemaker (2004). Brown-Brownson Revisited. The Monist 87 (4):573-593.
John Perry (1983). Personal Identity and the Concept of a Person. In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. The Hague: Nijhoff
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