Who they are and what de se: Burge on quasi-memory

Philosophical Studies 144 (2):297 - 311 (2009)
Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elements or presuppose facts about diachronic personal identity—facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies. The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, not an epistemological one.
Keywords Quasi-memory  Psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity  Diachronic personal identity  Personal identity
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DOI 10.2307/27734445
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1979). Attitudes de Dicto and de Se. Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Sydney Shoemaker (1970). Persons and Their Pasts. American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (4):269-85.

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