David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 172 (2):269–281 (2010)
I argue for an intentional conception of representation in science that requires bringing scientific agents and their intentions into the picture. So the formula is: Agents (1) intend; (2) to use model, M; (3) to represent a part of the world, W; (4) for some purpose, P. This conception legitimates using similarity as the basic relationship between models and the world. Moreover, since just about anything can be used to represent anything else, there can be no unified ontology of models. This whole approach is further supported by a brief exposition of some recent work in cognitive, or usage-based, linguistics. Finally, with all the above as background, I criticize the recently much discussed idea that claims involving scientific models are really fictions.
|Keywords||Agents Cognitive linguistics Fictions Intentions Models Scientific representation|
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References found in this work BETA
Nancy Cartwright (1999). The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Mauricio Suárez (2010). Scientific Representation. Philosophy Compass 5 (1):91-101.
Tarja Knuuttila & Mieke Boon (2011). How Do Models Give Us Knowledge? The Case of Carnot's Ideal Heat Engine. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (3):309-334.
Ronald N. Giere (2009). Scientific Perspectivism: Behind the Stage Door. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):221-223.
Steffen Ducheyne (2012). Scientific Representations as Limiting Cases. Erkenntnis 76 (1):73-89.
Adam Toon (2012). Similarity and Scientific Representation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (3):241-257.
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