David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):467-476 (2007)
In a recent IPQ article, Christopher Kaczor gave a promising argument in which he strove to reconcile the common belief that obstetric craniotomy (the crushing of nearlyborn fetuses’ heads) is immoral with his clear and intuitively attractive account of intention. One of Kaczor’s crucial assumptions is that intentional mutilation is morally impermissible. In this article I argue that Kaczor’s analysis has three potential problems: (1) the mutilating features of craniotomy do not appear to meet Kaczor’s criteria for being intended, so his account doesn’t show craniotomy to be impermissible; (2) some commonly-accepted acts, including voluntary sterilization, are acts of intentional mutilation according to Kaczor’s definition and are thus forbidden on his account; and (3) some acts that intuitively seem to constitute intentional mutilation do not meet Kaczor’s definition of “mutilation” and are not ruled out by his account. I suggest slight modifications to Kaczor’s account that might address these difficulties
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Werner Sauer (2006). Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption Bei Brentano. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):1-26.
Janice McLane (1996). The Voice on the Skin: Self-Mutilation and Merleau-Ponty's Theory of Language. Hypatia 11 (4):107 - 118.
Jukka Varelius (2011). Minimally Conscious State, Human Dignity, and the Significance of Species: A Reply to Kaczor. Neuroethics (Browse Results) 6 (1):85-95.
David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.
Christopher Kaczor (2001). Distinguishing Intention From Foresight. International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):77-89.
Sarah Chaney (2011). “A Hideous Torture on Himself”: Madness and Self-Mutilation in Victorian Literature. [REVIEW] Journal of Medical Humanities 32 (4):279-289.
Christopher Kaczor (2006). Nature as Reason. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1):121-122.
C. Kaczor (1998). Faith and Reason and Physician-Assisted Suicide. Christian Bioethics 4 (2):183-201.
Carrie Figdor (2003). Can Mental Representations Be Triggering Causes? Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):43-61.
Christopher Kaczor (2007). Intention, Foresight, and Mutilation: A Response to Giebel. International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):477-482.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads12 ( #286,939 of 1,796,224 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #349,760 of 1,796,224 )
How can I increase my downloads?