David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 52 (3):331-356 (1985)
In arguing a "role for history," Kuhn was proposing a naturalized philosophy of science. That, I argue, is the only viable approach to the philosophy of science. I begin by exhibiting the main general objections to a naturalistic approach. These objections, I suggest, are equally powerful against nonnaturalistic accounts. I review the failure of two nonnaturalistic approaches, methodological foundationism (Carnap, Reichenbach, and Popper) and metamethodology (Lakatos and Laudan). The correct response, I suggest, is to adopt an "evolutionary perspective." This perspective is defended against one recent critic (Putnam). To argue the plausibility of a naturalistic approach, I next sketch a naturalistic account of theories and of theory choice. This account is then illustrated by the recent revolution in geology. In conclusion I return to Kuhn's question about the role of history in developing a naturalistic theory of science
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Samuel Schindler (2013). The Kuhnian Mode of HPS. Synthese 190 (18):4137-4154.
Michael Bradie (1986). Assessing Evolutionary Epistemology. Biology and Philosophy 1 (4):401-459.
Samuel Schindler (2013). History and Philosophy of Science: Coherent Programme at Last? [REVIEW] Metascience 22 (2):457-460.
Harold I. Brown (1988). Normative Epistemology and Naturalized Epistemology. Inquiry 31 (1):53 – 78.
Kevin Kelly (2007). A New Solution to the Puzzle of Simplicity. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):561-573.
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