David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 61 (2):276-296 (1994)
This paper explores a new reason for preferring a model-theoretic approach to understanding the nature of scientific theories. Identifying the models in philosophers' model-theoretic accounts of theories with the concepts in cognitive scientists' accounts of categorization suggests a structure to families of models far richer than has commonly been assumed. Using classical mechanics as an example, it is argued that families of models may be "mapped" as an array with "horizontal" graded structures, multiply hierarchical "vertical" structures, and local "radial" structures. These structures promise important implications for how scientific theories are learned and used in actual scientific practice
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Ronald Giere (2010). An Agent-Based Conception of Models and Scientific Representation. Synthese 172 (2):269–281.
Craig DeLancey (2007). Phenomenal Experience and the Measure of Information. Erkenntnis 66 (3):329 - 352.
Pablo Lorenzano (2013). The Semantic Conception and the Structuralist View of Theories: A Critique of Suppe's Criticisms. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):600-607.
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