How (far) can rationality be naturalized?

Synthese 187 (1):243-268 (2012)
Abstract
The paper shows why and how an empirical study of fast-and-frugal heuristics can provide norms of good reasoning, and thus how (and how far) rationality can be naturalized. We explain the heuristics that humans often rely on in solving problems, for example, choosing investment strategies or apartments, placing bets in sports, or making library searches. We then show that heuristics can lead to judgments that are as accurate as or even more accurate than strategies that use more information and computation, including optimization methods. A standard way to defend the use of heuristics is by reference to accuracy-effort trade-offs. We take a different route, emphasizing ecological rationality (the relationship between cognitive heuristics and environment), and argue that in uncertain environments, more information and computation are not always better (the “less-can-be-more” doctrine). The resulting naturalism about rationality is thus normative because it not only describes what heuristics people use, but also in which specific environments one should rely on a heuristic in order to make better inferences. While we desist from claiming that the scope of ecological rationality is unlimited, we think it is of wide practical use.
Keywords Rationality  Judgment and decision-making  Uncertainty  Heuristics
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    References found in this work BETA
    Ken Binmore (2011). Rational Decisions. Princeton University Press.
    Rudolf Carnap (1947). On the Application of Inductive Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8 (1):133-148.

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