A Bayesian proof of a Humean principle

Abstract
Hume bases his argument against miracles on an informal principle. This paper gives a formal explication of this principle of Hume’s, and then shows that this explication can be rigorously proved in a Bayesian framework
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/42.2.255
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Colin Howson (2015). David Hume's No-Miracles Argument Begets a Valid No-Miracles Argument. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 54:41-45.
Peter Millican (2011). Twenty Questions About Hume's “Of Miracles”. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 68 (68):151-192.

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