A bayesian proof of a Humean principle
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):255-256 (1991)
| Abstract | Hume bases his argument against miracles on an informal principle. This paper gives a formal explication of this principle of Hume’s, and then shows that this explication can be rigorously proved in a Bayesian framework | |||||||||
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