Aptness of emotions for fictions and imaginings

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):468-489 (2011)
Abstract
Many philosophical accounts of the emotions conceive of them as susceptible to assessments of rationality, fittingness, or some other notion of aptness. Analogous assumptions apply in cases of emotions directed at what are taken to be only fictional or only imagined. My question is whether the criteria governing the aptness of emotions we have toward what we take to be real things apply invariantly to those emotions we have toward what we take to be only fictional or imagined. I argue that what counts as a reason justifying an emotion can differ across real, fictional, and imagined domains
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Brandom (1982). Points of View and Practical Reasoning. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):321 - 333.
G. Currie (2010). Tragedy. Analysis 70 (4):632-638.

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