A valid deduction of the generalization argument

Ethics 86 (1):87-91 (1975)
Abstract
Critics of marcus singer's deduction of the generalization argument from the principle of consequences and the generalization principle ("generalization in ethics," page 66) insist that his use of "everyone" in that deduction is ambiguous, I.E., "everyone" is used both collectively and distributively, And that the deduction is invalid. In this paper, I provide a valid deduction of the generalization argument from those premises which avoids this difficulty entirely. I argue that the conclusion so deduced is logically and morally equivalent to singer's
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Lansing Pollock (1977). The Principle of Consequences. Philosophical Studies 31 (6):385 - 390.
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